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ABSTRACT
My thesis is that there is a defensible argument for the existence of God from the
necessary existence of the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). James N. Anderson
and Greg A. Welty (A&W) offer such an argument. The purpose of my thesis is to
improve and defend some of the key premises of their argument.
One of the key premises which takes up the majority of my thesis is that LNC
is a necessarily true proposition. With the help from work by Tuomas E. Tahko
and Francesco Berto, I explicate interpretations of LNC which are different from
A&W’s interpretation and then defend them against some of the main objections
in the literature. Specifically, I combine Berto’s emphasis on the mutual exclusiv-
ity of certain properties with Tahko’s notion of “genuinely possible configurations
of the world.” Some of the objections include ones from Graham Priest, accord-
ing to whom there are true contradictions in the actual world, and objections that
there are abstract inconsistent objects in possible worlds. But I counter objections
of the former by using Tahko’s strategy to show that Priest’s examples are issues
of semantics, and for the latter I explicate one half of a dilemma by Ben Martin,
according to which the actual world would be an impossible world if there were
such inconsistent objects.
The other key premise of A&W’s argument is that all propositions are divine
thoughts. Colin P. Ruloff argues that there is a better alternative theory of propo-
sitions in which propositions are not thoughts. But I counter this by arguing that
his proposed theory is consistent with propositions being divine thoughts.
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NOMENCLATURE
A&W Anderson and Welty
LNC Law of Non-Contradiction
M Metaphysical LNC
SA Serious Actualism
FPR Fregean Propositional Realism
STA Singular Term Argument
NPR Non-human Propositional Realism
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1 INTRODUCTION
This major section introduces the argument.
In their article ‘The Lord of Non-Contradiction: An Argument for God from
Logic,’ James N. Anderson and Greg A. Welty (hereafter, ‘A&W’) offer an argu-
ment for the existence of God from the necessary existence of the laws of logic. In
their conclusion section, they summarize the argument:
The laws of logic are necessary truths about truths; they are necessarily
true propositions. Propositions are real entities, but cannot be physical
entities; they are essentially thoughts. So the laws of logic are neces-
sarily true thoughts. Since they are true in every possible world, they
must exist in every possible world. But if there are necessarily existent
thoughts, there must be a necessarily existent mind; and if there is a
necessarily existent mind, there must be a necessarily existent person.
A necessarily existent person must be spiritual in nature, because no
physical entity exists necessarily. Thus, if there are laws of logic, there
must also be a necessarily existent, personal, spiritual being. The laws
of logic imply the existence of God. (Anderson & Welty, 2011, 337-8)
A&W use some terms of art. ‘The laws of logic’ are principles of rational
thought that govern valid inference.1 There are at least two notable examples
that go back to Aristotle: the Law of Excluded Middle, which is that every state-
ment must be either true or false, and the Law of Non-contradiction (LNC), that
no statement can be both true and false. Another term is ‘propositions.’ For now
we can think of propositions as those things which are true or false, are typically
expressed by declarative sentences, and represent things in certain ways. A pos-
sible world is a total way things could have been. For A&W the concept of God
is that of a necessarily existent, personal, spiritual being. Such a being would be
1Ibid., 322.
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personal because the only kinds of minds we know about are those of humans
and those of animals, and it is doubtful that an animal can entertain the laws of
logic. And such a being would be spiritual or immaterial because the laws of logic
would be nonphysical.2
As I understand A&W’s argument, it has two important parts: The first half
purports to show that the laws of logic are necessarily true propositions, and the
second half purports to show that all propositions are thoughts. Given the truth of
these two premises, the inferences to the conclusion that God exists are relatively
uncontroversial.
The view that propositions are effects of mental activity is called conceptualism.
There have been a few other theistic arguments that utilize it. Robert Adams
(1987) suggests one that appeals to possibilities3 and to necessary truths. On the
one hand, possibilities and necessary truths exist independently of whether we
humans ever thought of them. But on the other, they cannot exist independently
of some mind thinking them — conceptualism. But, Adams concludes that these
two conflicting, yet independently plausible, views “can both be held together if
we suppose that there is a nonhuman mind that eternally and necessarily exists
and thinks all the possibilities and necessary truths”.4 Alvin Plantinga (2007)
called his the argument from ‘intentionality (or aboutness).’
Representing things as being thus and so, being about something or other;
this seems to be a property or activity of minds or perhaps thoughts. So
2Ibid., 336, fn. 32.
3Quentin Smith (1994) has a theistic conceptualist argument that appeals to possibilities too,
specifically that possibilities are propositions. Smith’s version gives us a God who is omniscient,
given that we add a premise that links the relation between the divine attribute of omniscient and
“the attribute of conceiving everything that God knows.”
A&W’s argument, though, and my version of it, does not on its own give us an omniscience
being. So, the necessarily existent, spiritual person is compatible with deism. But I can still call
the argument theistic because it supplements the overall case for theism.
4Ibid., 218.
2
it’s extremely tempting to think of propositions as ontologically de-
pendent upon mental or intellectual activity in such a way that either
they just are thoughts, or else at any rate couldn’t exist if not thought
of. [...] But if we are thinking of human thinkers, then there are far
too many propositions: at least, for example, one for every real num-
ber that is distinct from the Taj Mahal. On the other hand, if they
were divine thoughts, no problem here. So perhaps we should think
of propositions as divine thoughts. Then in our thinking we would
literally be thinking God’s thoughts after him.5
Plantinga’s argument has one other key premise too: there are too many proposi-
tions for humans to produce. One way that A&W’s version differs from the other
two is that they appeal to the specific set of propositions, namely, logical laws,
and they use LNC as a case study. Here is how I formulate A&W’s argument:
(1) The laws of logic are necessarily true propositions.
(2) If the laws of logic are necessarily true propositions, then they nec-
essarily exist.
(3) So, the laws of logic necessarily exist. (from 1 and 2)
(4) All propositions are thoughts. (Conceptualism)
(5) So, the laws of logic are necessarily existent, true thoughts. (from
1, 3 and 4)
(6) If the laws of logic are necessarily existent, true thoughts, then
there is a necessarily existent mind.
So, (7) there is a necessarily existent mind. (from 5 and 6)
I mostly follow their version. But I argue for the necessary truth of a different
kind of interpretation of LNC, one that does not fall prey to some of the objec-
tions that can be raised against theirs. We will see that the interpretation reveals
a deeper, more fundamental principle. It is about the world, objects and their
properties, rather than about propositions and their truth. It might even be why
their version is sound if it is sound. For A&W LNC is a law of logic; for me it
5Ibid., 211.
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is a law metaphysics. Much has been written about semantic interpretations, but
little has been written, in comparison, about metaphysical interpretations. So, I
will not argue for their premise that there are logical laws. Here is a statement of
my version of A&W’s argument:
(M1) LNC is a necessarily true proposition.
(M2) If LNC is a necessarily true proposition, then it necessarily exists.
(M3) So, LNC necessarily exists. (from M1 and M2)
(M4) All propositions are thoughts. (Conceptualism)
(M5) So, LNC is a necessarily existent, true thought. (from M1, M3
and M4)
(M6) If LNC is a necessarily existent, true thought, then there is a nec-
essarily existent mind.
So, (M7) there is a necessarily existent mind. (from M5 and M6)
I use ‘M’ just to stand for ‘metaphysical’ because LNC for me is about the world.
My defenses of premises M4 to M6 then will be similar to A&W’s.
The first major section of my thesis will argue for the truth of M1 and M2, and
the other section will argue for the remaining ones.
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2 FIRST HALF OF ARGUMENT
In this major section, I defend the first two premises (M1) and (M2), which entail
(M3).
(M1) LNC is a necessarily true proposition.
(M2) If LNC is a necessarily true proposition, then it necessarily exists.
(M3) So, LNC necessarily exists. (from M1 and M2)
2.1 LNC is a necessarily true proposition
This section explicates and defends metaphysical interpretations of LNC.
2.1.1 Different kinds of interpretations
LNC is a principle that forbids contradiction. There are four basic kinds of contra-
dictions: syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and ontological. So, there are four basic
kinds of formulations of LNC. Francesco Berto (2006, sec. 1) provides a taxonomy
of formulations that reveal the differences in each of their logical structures. For
now I will follow his brief descriptions of them and expand on them later when
context requires.
(1) Berto begins with syntactic formulations. He says that LNC is a linguistic
object of a certain form.1 Contradictions are conjunctions of formulae (or pairs of
formulae), typically, α ∧¬α for any statement α. Thus, a syntactic formulation of
LNC would be this:
(LNC1) ¬(α ∧¬α)
1Ibid., 283.
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LNC1 can express the forbidding of formulae of the form α∧¬α in the sense that
such formulae are not provable in a proof system. Indeed, LNC1 is a theorem in
numerous logical systems, including classical logic and intuitionistic logic.
(2) Berto moves on to semantic formulations.2 Such formulations appeal to
truth and falsity as predicates that apply to statement names. Where dαe is a name
for statement α, a semantic contradiction can look like T dαe ∧ Fdαe, in English
‘Both α is true and α is false.’ A semantic LNC would be:
(LNC2a) ¬(T dαe ∧Fdαe)
The statement ‘It is raining’ is not both be true and false at the same time. LNC2a
can express the forbidding of semantic contradictions in the sense that such con-
tradictions are assigned F in every row of a truth table. Indeed, statements of the
form ¬(α ∧¬α) are tautologies in the semantics of classical logic.
For another semantic formulation, Berto observes that it is widely accepted
by both supporters and critics of LNC that falsity is truth of negation, that is,
they accept the equivalence Fdαe ↔ T d¬αe. Hence, we get the following being
equivalent to (LNC2a):
(LNC2b) ¬(T dαe ∧ T d¬αe)
‘It is not the case both that α is true and that not-α is true.’ For instance, ‘It is
raining’ and ‘It is not raining’ is not both be true at the same time.
(3) Pragmatic formulations of LNC involve the mental states of the acceptance
and rejection of a statement. Berto defines ‘acceptance’ as this: Rational agent x
accepts α just in case x believes that α. He introduces a statement operator ‘`x’
2Ibid., 283.
6
for an intuitive reading of ‘(rational agent) x accepts that.’3 So, one pragmatic
contradiction is `x α∧ `x ¬α. It would seem contradictory of someone to both
rationally accept that ‘It is raining’ and accept that ‘It is not raining.’ So, we have
(LNC3a) ¬(`x α∧ `x ¬α)
‘It is not the case that both (rational agent) x accepts α and accepts ¬α.’ The source
of forbidding would come from our concept of rationality or acceptance.
In addition, x rejects α just in case x positively refuses to believe α. If we add
another sentential operator ‘ax’ to mean ‘(rational agent) x rejects that’, then we
have another pragmatic LNC:
(LNC3b) ¬(`x α∧ ax α)
‘It is not the case that both x accepts α and rejects α.’ For example, it is contradic-
tory of someone to both rationally accept and reject that ‘It is raining.’
(4) Finally, ontological (or metaphysical) formulations appeal to objects-cum-
properties or states of affairs. States of affairs are entities constituted by objects
and properties. The object Socrates and the property being wise constitute the
state of affairs of Socrates’ being wise, and it obtains or not. One way to think
of a contradictory state of affairs or an inconsistent object would be to think of
something that both had a specific property and lacked that property, which can
be formulated as ∃x(α(x)∧¬α(x)). For example, this billiard ball is not green all
over and not green all over at the same time. So, one can forbid an ontological
contradiction like this:
(LNC4a) ∀x¬(α(x)∧¬α(x))
3Ibid., 284.
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Berto then adds one more formulation. We can shift into second order logic in
which we quantify over properties too,
(LNC4b) ∀x∀P¬(P x∧¬P x)4
‘For any individual x and property P , it is not the case that both x has P and x
does not have P .’ Being green all over does not at the same time belong to this
billiard ball and not belong to this billiard ball. This forbidding would not be due
to some logical system or some notion of rationality; it would have to come from
the structure of the world.
I think that as an ontological principle LNC constrains the structure of reality.
It states a restriction on things rather than on statements or mental states. On
the other hand, as a logical or pragmatic principle, it governs language or our
thoughts. If it does not even do that, then it is merely a principle that holds in
certain models, that is, logical systems like classical logic, intuitionistic logic, etc.,
and it has no bearing on mind-independent reality.
2.1.2 LNC is true
I begin by following Tuomas E. Tahko for the truth of something like LNC4a and
LNC4b in the actual world. Berto (2006, 292) observes that Aristotle did not dis-
cuss the question of whether LNC was true in his Organon, which are his writings
on logic. Rather, he discussed it in his Metaphysics. For him, such as question will
4There is a possible worry here. Proponents of LNC want a formulation of LNC to entail that
it is not the case that both something has a property P and everything does not have P , ¬(∃xP x
∧ ¬∃xP x). The ∧ operates on two compound propositions. But LNC4b seems to not entail that
because LNC4b’s ∧ operates on an atomic proposition on the left, P 1x1 or P 2x1,x2. This assumes
that propositions have a logical structure which is analogous to sentences in a formal language.
But if such is the case, then the logical operators are truth functional, that is, the truth values
of all compound propositions are solely determined by the truth values of the atomic ones. So, if
LNC is true of any atomic proposition P nx1...xn, then it is also true of all propositions α. Then we
have LNC in the general case: for any proposition α, ¬(α ∧ ¬α). But that entails what we want,
¬(∃xP x ∧ ¬∃xP x), because ∃xP x is a proposition.
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be answered by ontological rather than merely formal, logical means. The first
formulation in Book IV of Metaphysics is like LNC4b:
[T]he same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to
the same subject and in the same respect. (Aristotle, 2014, 3418)
There are constraints on what kind of properties a particular kind of thing can
and cannot have. For example, someone cannot both win and not win a game
of chess at the same time. The property of being a winner cannot simultaneously
belong and not belong to that person in the same game. There are constraints at
the basic level of physical reality too. For example, an electric charge cannot at
the same time belong and not belong to the same subatomic particle and in the
same atom. Indeed, discussion of the LNC4 working at this fundamental physical
level is a good place to start. For particles form atoms, and atoms are the smallest
unit of matter. Atoms are the basis for every other physical object in the universe.
Even if it is obvious that there is consistency on the macrophysical level, that
does not mean that such consistency could not have emerged from microphysical
inconsistency.
Tahko (2009) uses electric charge as a case study, and I follow his exposition
of it. There are two kinds of charges of opposing polarities: positive and negative.
An electron has a negative charge, and a proton has a positive one. Both charges
are of the same magnitude. Similar charges repel. But dissimilar charges attract.
Electrons and their energy levels conform to the fundamental physical law Pauli
Exclusion Principle (PEP), which states that two electrons in an atom cannot have
the same quantum number at the same time. It keeps atoms from collapsing.
Suppose that there are two electrons in the same orbit. Then they have the same
values for the size of the orbital n, the shape of the orbital l, and the orientation
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in space of the orbital ml. But by the principle, the values for the spin ms must be
different. So, they have opposite ‘half-integer spins,’ 1/2 and -1/2. More gener-
ally, PEP applies to all particles of half-integer spin called ‘fermions.’ An electric
charge can be considered as a property of an object. So, Tahko (2009, 35) infers,
it is an exhaustive property, that is, the actual laws of physics require that at any
given time an electron must have it or not.
Tahko (2012, 410) indicates that apart from the fact that there is no observed
violation of PEP, atoms would not hold together if the same particle could simul-
taneously both have and not have a charge. They would collapse.5 He entertains
the idea that even if they somehow could hold and not hold together at the same
time, they would be unstable and all macrophysical objects then would both exist
and not exist.6 I think the idea is that a macrophysical object’s existence depends
on the holding of its constituent atoms. So, if they do not hold then the object
would not exist. But macrophysical existence requires stability. He gives an ex-
ample of a glass bottle.7 A particular glass bottle of beer b exists because it has
a stable macrophysical structure. Such macrophysical properties including be-
ing rigid, containing an alcoholic beverage, etc. But these properties exist because
there are certain stable microphysical structures. He concludes that b has a sta-
ble macrophysical structure (in part) because certain fundamental laws of physics
hold, that is, PEP.
PEP is not an instance of LNC4b, but it can be thought of as a restricted ver-
sion of it, because LNC4b is about objects of any kind while PEP is about objects
of a certain kind. So, we will have to look elsewhere on our quest to find a contra-
diction in the world.
5Ibid., 412.
6Tahko (2009, 35)
7Tahko (2015, 111)
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2.1.2.1 Against LNC
Before we embark on such a quest, some key distinctions are in order. Ben Martin
(2014, 62) distinguishes three related positions in the literature.
Dialetheism: There are true contradictions at the actual world
Absolutism: There are true contradictions at a metaphysically possible
world
Paraconsistency: Explosion is invalid
In classical logic (and intuitionist logic) the logical consequence relation is explo-
sive, that is, it validates the logical rule α,¬α ` β. The latin name of this rule is
ex contradictione quodlibet, that is, roughly, any statement follows from a contra-
diction. On the other hand, paraconsistent logics are not explosive. If we are in a
situation in which the information that is available is not consistent, then the con-
sequence relation does not explode into triviality. The view that every statement
is true is trivialism. But many paraconsistent logics validate LNC1, ` ¬(α ∧¬α),
even though they invalidate explosion.
Let’s see how these views relate to each other. A paraconsistent logician does
not have to be an absolutist or a dialetheist. Such a logician can accept non-
explosion if they think that the logical consequence should also preserve infor-
mation content in addition to truth. On the other hand, a dialetheist or absolutist
should be a paraconsistent logician to avoid being a trivialist. Dialetheism is dis-
tinguished from trivialism because dialetheism is a particular affirmative state-
ment, that is, that there is at least one actually true contradiction, a dialetheia,
rather than a universal affirmative statement, that is, that all contradictions are
true. A trivialist must be a dialetheist (because if every statement is true, then
at least one contradiction is). Finally, a dialetheist must be an absolutist, but an
11
absolutist need not be a dialetheist because the actual world is a metaphysically
possible one.
2.1.2.1.1 Metaphysical dialetheism
We can think of different kinds of dialetheias: semantic dialetheias T dαe ∧
Fdαe, metaphysical dialetheias ∃x(α(x) ∧ ¬α(x)), pragmatic dialetheias `x α∧ `x
¬α, etc. So, minimally, semantic dialetheism is the view that there are semantic
dialetheias and metaphysical dialetheism is the view that there are metaphysical
dialetheias. But there is more to this distinction.
Edwin Mares (2004) first introduced it. He expresses it this way:
The metaphysical dialetheist holds that there are aspects of the world
(or of some possible world) for which any accurate description will
contain a true contradiction. Semantic dialetheism, on the other hand,
maintains that it is always possible to redescribe this aspect of the
world, using a different vocabulary (or perhaps vocabularies), consis-
tently without sacrificing accuracy.8
For the metaphysical dialetheist, a dialetheia is in the language of an accurate
description of the world, and there is a fact in the world that makes the dialetheia
true. In contrast, for the semantic dialetheist, any such state of affairs or fact can
be accounted for by using a different language, one that is just as accurate and
complete in its description of the world and yet is consistent. Mares observes the
fact that paraconsistent logicians usually use a consistent metatheory to describe
their logics.9 So, a semantic dialetheist can use a consistent metalanguage while
acknowledging that there is a true contradiction in the object language.
Tahko (2009, 38) infers from this that by semantic dialetheism, a contradiction
is true in a language or model. On the other hand, by metaphysical dialetheism,
8Ibid., 270
9Ibid.
12
a contradiction is true in the world. Tahko (2014, s. 1, 2) explains these two dif-
ferent senses of ‘truth.’ A truth in a model or language is a statement that is true
when interpreted in a particular language. This kind of relative truth is not a
property of statements. Aristotle’s other law, the Law of Excluded Middle, is not
true relative to intuitionistic logic, but it is true relative to classical logic. But an
absolute truth is a statement that is unconditionally true in the world. It is a prop-
erty of statements. ‘Snow is white’ has the property of being absolutely true just in
case snow is white – in the world, unconditionally.10 (This is an instance of Alfred
Tarski’s truth schema, where there is an apparent relation between language and
the world.)
The most prominent dialetheist is Graham Priest. He is at least a semantic
dialetheist but is neutral with respect to the metaphysical kind: “Mares takes me
to be a metaphysical dialetheist, but In Contradiction is, in fact largely neutral
on most of the relevant issues” (Priest, 2006, 302). Nevertheless, he attempts to
explicate the conditions that must hold for one to be a metaphysical dialetheist:
To be a metaphysical dialetheist, one must suppose that it makes sense
to talk about reality itself, as opposed to what is said about it. That is,
one must suppose that
1: There is an extra-linguistic reality
Next, this reality must comprise things that are propositional in some
sense, or the talk of its being consistent or inconsistent would make no
sense. (Thus, if reality were just constituted by objects such as tables
and chairs, saying that it was consistent or inconsistent would be a
simple category mistake. [...]) So we must have that
10Perhaps, it can be maintained that to say that ‘Snow is white’ is true is semantically equivalent,
that is, has all and only the same information, to saying that snow is white. So, the former can
be reduced or deflated to the latter. Stoljar & Damnjanovic (2014) say that this is an example
of a deflationary theory of truth. According to such a theory, we can sensibly ascribe truth to
statements without positing a property of truth.
But the two statements are not semantically equivalent. They contain different information. The
former states that there is a sentence that has the property truth while the latter states that there
is frozen atmospheric water vapor that has the property of whiteness.
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2: Reality is constituted by facts
or by fact-like entities such as objects-cum-properties. Even given 2,
there is still nothing consistent or inconsistent simply in a bunch of
facts. There must therefore be more to the matter than this; there must
be something within the structure of facts that corresponds to negation
in language. It must be the case that
3: There are polarities within facts
That is, if f + is a possible fact, say one that would make α true, there
must be a corresponding one, f −, that would make ¬α true. (Priest,
2006, 300)
Metaphysical dialetheism then amounts to the view that for some f both f + and
f − obtain. Since f + would make α true, this kind of dialetheism requires a theory
of truth, such as a truthmaker theory. The intuition behind a truthmaker theory
is that truth depends on what exists. If ‘Socrates is human’ is true, then there is
a fact in the world that makes it true, that is, Socrates’ being human, which pre-
supposes the existence of the constituent object Socrates. A truthmaker theorist
can also be a truthmaker maximalist, according to whom every truth has at least
one truthmaker. But then there must be a negative fact f − that makes ¬α true.
Absences, lacks, voids and omissions are candidates for being negative facts (or
constituents thereof). If ‘That hole in the ground is small’ or ‘Beethoven is deaf’
is true, then there should be a negative fact, like The ground’s being such that it has
a small void of solid mass or Beethoven’s lacking the ability to hear.
2.1.2.1.2 Negative facts
But there is a strong intuition against the existence of negative facts. Bertrand
Russell introduced the concept of a truthmaker as central to his logical atomism,
in which the most basic facts are atomic ones, that is, facts in which one particular
object having a property (for example, This particular object’s being blue.) or mul-
tiple objects standing in a relation make atomic statements (‘This is blue.’) true.
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But he acknowledged:
There is implanted in the human breast an almost unquenchable de-
sire to find some way of avoiding the admission that negative facts are
as ultimate as those that are positive (Russell, 1919, 4).
George Molnar (2000) offers some reasons why we should follow this intuition.
I go along with his exposition. He distinguishes what they are purportedly and
what we thinks they are not: absences are states of the world, first-order, and
causally relevant; but they are not things, properties, or what he calls ‘causally
operative.’11 On the other hand, positive facts can be reduced and do not require
a unique category in our ontology. They are not anything “over and above their
constituents,” which is (first-order) things, properties and relations. But negative
states of affairs are a different kind of entity from positive ones. So, Molnar in-
fers that they cannot have things, properties and relations as constituents because
such things, properties and relations do not exist.12
Another reason Molnar (2000, 77) gives for thinking that absences do not exist
is that they are radically acausal. He qualifies: they are not acausal uncondition-
ally, because they are causal in the sense of causally explanatory. But such causality
is a subjective, rational relation and is context-dependent. So, if they exist, then
they do not exist independently of us. The reason that there are explanations is
because we want to know answers to questions. He observes, the content of our
background knowledge and our pragmatic interests in bringing about and pre-
venting events are two major factors that determine which questions and which
criteria of good answers get selected.13 Molnar uses this example: ‘Lack of air
caused him to suffocate’ can be an explanans in a certain context of explanation
11Ibid., 76.
12Ibid., 77.
13Ibid., 78.
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and it may well be a good answer. On the other hand, ‘Lack of poison caused him
to remain alive’ would not be a good explanans in the same context.
But Molnar identifies that absences are acausal in a different kind of causality,
that is, causally operative. For him, this causality is an objective relation. ‘Event A
operatively causes event B’ entails ‘The objects involved in A and B have certain
powers.’14 The relatum makes a difference to the outcome of a causal process. To
illustrate, here is my example. Suppose that I want to start a primitive fire in the
wilderness by using a hand drill. Then that it is a particular rainy day is relevant.
If I cannot form an amber as the spindle tip glows red or I cannot sustain a flame
as the amber is in a tinder bundle because the materials are too wet, then I will
not succeed in getting a fire. The rain is causally operative in my not succeeding.
But negative facts would not be causally operative. Molnar indicates that only a
something can be either the starting point or the terminus of a causal processes; a
nothing cannot.15 He then appeals to the Eleatic Stranger’s reality test16: to be is
to be powerful, to make a difference in the world. Plato’s Stranger in the Sophist
tells Theaetetus his criterion for existence:
I’m saying that a thing really is if it has any capacity at all, either by
nature to do something to something else or to have even the smallest
thing done to it by even the most trivial thing, even if it only happens
once. I’ll take it as a definition that those which are amount to nothing
other than capacity. (Cooper & Hutchinson, 1997, 269, s. 247e)
So, absences fail such a reality test.
Another reason to think that absences do not exist is that they are not per-
ceived. Molnar (2000, 79) offers an example of a possible direct perception of a
14Ibid.
15Ibid., 77.
16Ibid., 79.
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negative state of affairs. He has us consider two figures of circles in which the first
one has a dot in the center of it and the second one is empty of any other figures.17
For the first one, we non-inferentially perceive the positive state of affairs of The
dot’s being in the circle. Likewise, for the second one, according to the story, we
non-inferentially perceive the negative state of affairs of The circle’s being empty
of dots, but given that we look for a dot. So, there is a negative fact that is just as
perceivable, and perceivable in the same sense, as a positive one. So, according to
the argument, we have reasons to believe in the existence of negative facts which
are the same for believing in positive ones.
But Molnar observes that the first circle is not only empty of dots; it is also
empty of squares, triangles, crosses, etc.18 So, there are indefinitely many nega-
tive facts that occupy the same location in visual space: The circle’s being empty
of squares, The circle’s being empty of triangles, and so forth. We do not non-
inferentially perceive all of them because we are not looking for squares and tri-
angles too. Conversely, we are looking for a dot in the left circle. So, Molnar
concludes that our perception of the circle being empty of dots is inferential.19 We
infer to such a perception from that we are looking for the presence of a certain
kind of thing. So, the perceptions of the positive and negative states of affairs
are not he same kind of perceptions: the former is non-inferential and the latter
is. So, the alleged negative state of affairs is not an example of a possible direct
perception of a negative state of affairs.
So, we have some good reason to follow our intuition to reject negative facts.
But Priest’s third condition on metaphysical dialetheism requires it. So, we need
a positive case for metaphysical dialetheism.
17Ibid., 79.
18Ibid., 80.
19Ibid.
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2.1.2.1.3 A case for metaphysical dialetheism
The main motivations for dialetheism is to render certain semantic paradoxes
harmless. Consider the Liar – a paradox of self-reference:
(L) (L) is false.
(L) refers to itself. Is it true or false? Suppose that (L) is true. Then its content
matches reality. So, it is false. But now suppose that (L) is false. Then this just is
its content. So, it is true. If we accept the Law of Excluded Middle, then (L) is both
true and false, which is a dialetheia. This conflicts with LNC2. One response is to
reject the Law of Excluded Middle; another is the dialetheist’s: accept the truth of
the dialetheia. So, the paradox is accepted but without explosion.
There are other paradoxes that might be taken to be counterexamples to LNC4.
But if such examples can all be given a satisfactory explanation with regard to
semantic but not metaphysical dialetheism, then we are rationally free to reject
metaphysical dialetheism. Priest (2006, ch. 11-12) presents some paradoxes con-
cerning change which might act as sources of true contradictions in the world.
Tahko (2009) responds to most of these arguments, and I follow his lead.
2.1.2.1.4 Priest’s paradoxes involving change
In the first of the two chapters on change, Priest begins by offering some or-
dinary examples that includes instants of change. The first such instant is one at
which he uses a pen that both touches a paper and does not touch that paper:
As I write, my pen is touching the paper. As I come to the end of a
word I lift it off. At one time it is on; at another it is off (that is, not
on). Since the motion is continuous, there must be an instant at which
the pen leaves the paper. At that instant, is it on the paper or off? [...]
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The trouble is that there seems to be no good reason to say one rather
than the other. It seems as much on as off, and as much off as on. [...]
[T]here is, presumably, a last instant at which the distance between the
point of my pen and the paper is zero, but no first point at which it is
non-zero.20
So, we should say that it both does and does not touch the paper. (Priest, 2006,
160) suggests that maybe we can identity ‘being on’ with ‘being zero distance
from,’ in which case the pin is on the paper during the instant at which it leaves
the paper. But he thinks this will not do because when an arrow is fired into the
ground, at the instant of impact, before penetration, the arrow is zero distance
from the ground, yet he asks, “is the arrow on the ground?”21
I think it is more intuitive to define ‘being on’ with ‘being zero distance from
and being supported by the surface of’, in which case the pin is on the paper at the
relevant moment, and the arrow is, seemingly, not on the ground at its relevant
moment. So, we do not have to resort to saying that the pen both touches the paper
and does not touch it. Tahko (2009, 40)’s solution is to merely observe that just
because “we can define ‘touching the paper’ in terms of the electrical repulsion
between the pen and the paper (or something similar)” does not mean that there
is a contradiction in the world.
The second example (Priest, 2006) gives is a phenomenological one:
For days I have been puzzling over a problem. Suddenly the solution
strikes me. Now, at the instant the solution strikes me, do I or do I
not know the answer? [...] Before, I did not know the answer; after, I
did. Moreover, one cannot suppose that in this case there is some tie-
breaking ulterior fact. My epistemological state is all there is, and that
is symmetrical. It makes little sense to suppose that I either did or did
20Ibid., 160.
21Ibid.
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not determinately know the answer at the instant of change, though I
am unaware which.22
Here again I think indeterminacy is in our semantics. What does it mean to ‘know
the answer’? If Priest believes that the solution is indeed the solution at the instant
it strikes him, then he believes the answer. Knowledge is justified true belief. So,
the answer is a belief. The answer is true too. But is he justified at that moment
to believe the answer? There are certainly different definitions of epistemological
‘justification.’ Some may include that some time should lapse before a person is
justified. But some may not. If we have good reason to think that we can have non-
inferential and immediate knowledge, then we can say that Priest is also justified
at the instant he believes it. So, we do not need to resort to saying that Priest both
does and does not know the answer at the instant the solution strikes him.
And here’s his last example of the same kind:
I am in a room. As I walk through the door, am I in the room or out
of (not in) it? To emphasize that this is not a problem of vagueness,
suppose we identify my position with that of my centre of gravity, and
the door with the vertical plane passing through its centre of gravity.
As I leave the room there must be an instant at which the point lies on
the plane. At that instant am I in or out? Clearly, there is no reason for
saying one rather than the other. (Priest, 2006, 161)
Once more, this can be explained by an issue concerning language. Tahko (2009,
41) identifies the vague phrase: ‘being in a room.’ If in the definition we include
the doorway, then we can say that Priest is in the room. If we exclude it, then he is
not in the room. But because we are free to stipulate either way shows, according
to Priest, that being in or not being in has no better claim than the other: the
change is intrinsically contradictory.
22Ibid., 161.
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But, Tahko observes, we lack a specific definition for ‘being in a room’ because
in ordinary contexts there is no need to define it as precisely as Priest demands.23
If we needed such precision, then we can determine it with such. Tahko refers to
an example in soccer. There are methods in place, with assistance of electronic
devices, to determine when a soccer ball has “completely crossed the goal line in
between the goal-posts and underneath the crossbar.”24 (The International Foot-
ball Association Board even officially approved the use of goal line technology.25)
So, there is no reason why we cannot determine whether Priest is in a room. There
is vagueness alright, contra Priest, but such vagueness is in our semantics, not in
the world.
2.1.2.1.5 Priest’s paradox involving motion
Priest offers another kind of paradox. Aristotle thinks Zeno developed four
paradoxes against the existence of motion. Of these Priest (2006, 174) thinks that
Zeno’s arrow paradox is the most profound example of a true contradiction. The
moving arrow concerns local motion, which is the most basic kind of transition.
Here’s how Aristotle states it:
Zeno’s reasoning, however, is fallacious, when he says that if every-
thing when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that which is
in locomotion is always in a now, the flying arrow is therefore motion-
less. This is false; for time is not composed of indivisible nows any
more than any other magnitude is composed of indivisibles. (Aristo-
tle, 2014, 890, s. 239b.30)
The third is that already given above, to the effect that the flying arrow
is at rest, which result follows from the assumption that time is com-
posed of moments: if this assumption is not granted, the conclusion
will not follow. (Aristotle, 2014, 891, s. 239b.30)
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
25“Greater use of goal-line technology,” FIFA.com (2016)
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Nick Huggett (2010, sec. 3.3) explains the paradox this way. Take into considera-
tion an arrow which appears to be moving. Then it either travels some distance,
that is, it changes its location, during that moment or does not. For Zeno, the
arrow is at rest during the instant it occupies an equal space because there are no
smaller units of time than instants that would allow the arrow to change location.
But the whole period of time over which the arrow is allegedly in motion consists
of only instants. So, the arrow is at rest during each such instant. So, the arrow
cannot be moving at any time. So, it does not travel some distance during the
moment.
Aristotle’s own solution above to the paradox is to deny that time is made up
of indivisible instants.26 So, either time consists of divisible instants or not. If it
does, then either there is velocity at these divisible instants or not. On the other
hand, if time does not consist of divisible instants, then instants in time do not
exist. Frank Arntzenius (2000) lays out three views which are compatible with
Aristotle’s denial solution:
(i) [T]he “at-at” theory, according to which there is no such thing as
instantaneous velocity, while motion in the sense of the occupation of
different locations at different times is possible,
(ii) the “impetus” theory, according to which instantaneous velocities
do exist but these are only contingently and causally related to the
temporal developments of positions,
(iii) the “no instants” theory, according to which instants in time do not
exist, and hence instantaneous velocities do not exist, while motion, in
the sense of different areas occupied during different time intervals, is
possible.27
By (i), there is nothing more to motion than the occupation of different locations
at different times. Zeno’s arrow occupies succeeding points in space at different
26Ibid.
27Ibid., 187.
22
times (Huggett, 2010). This is a relational or extrinsic rather than an intrinsic
view of motion in that motion at a given time exists only in relation to other times.
Theorists of (i) agrees with Zeno that there is no instantaneous velocity. So, at
each instant the arrow is at rest. And they agree that instants constitute time. So,
the arrow makes no progress at each individual instant. But they disagree with
Zeno in that the sum of the instants is greater than its parts. So, there is motion
over an interval, a sequence of instants. Zeno’s puzzle is resolved. This theory is
an instance of what Priest called a “cinematic account of change.” It is so named
because, as Chris Mortensen (2015, sec. 6) identifies, change is “like a succession
of stills in a film only continuously connected.”
Arntzenius (2000, 190) identifies some problems with this stripped down mo-
tion. First, to use an example similar to his, it is intuitive to say that this bus is
moving at this instant, that the whole state of the bus at this instant includes its
moving. Second, there are sequences of states which are indistinguishable from
corresponding rest-states but which are not motion-states. Priest gives this short
example: “If God were to take temporal slices of an object at rest in different
places and string them together in a continuous fashion, he would not make the
object move” (Priest, 2006, 174). And third, Tahko (2009, 41-42) indicates that
we measure the velocity of an object at a time from the locations of the object at
different times; yet, this does not imply that such velocity can fully be reduced to
such locations at such times.
Now consider theory (ii). By (ii), motion is an intrinsic property. It is intrinsic
in the sense that it cannot be reduced to times and locations. This is an intrinsic
account of motion because a body moves only because of the properties of the
body at the instant. So, there does not exist a distinction between a body which
is moving and one that is stationary one at any given instant. The moving body
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has a tendency or potential to move in a certain direction while the stationary one
does not. So, the property of motion is also a kind of dispositional property. A
vase is disposed to being fragile. If it were to fall on a hard surface from a sufficient
height then it would break in normal circumstances. At any instant a billiard ball
amoves in a specific direction because it has an intrinsic velocity, and this velocity
is part of the intrinsic sate of a at a time t. Arntzenius (2000, 201) concludes that
the main worry about this view is from the principle of theoretical simplicity or
parsimony. Aristotle states it in Book I of Posterior Analytics:
Let that demonstration be better which, other things being equal, de-
pends on fewer postulates or suppositions or propositions. (Aristotle,
2014, 322)
According to Arntzenius, we must add a further postulate, which is a quantity
called “intrinsic velocity,” to our ontology and add a natural law that equates the
value of this quantity with the value of the velocity, where this other velocity is
the ratio of distance and time. Other things being equal, we may not want to add
it if we think parsimony is a constraint on a metaphysical theory.
Priest’s solution is to accept the dialetheia that the arrow is both where it is
and where it is not at the same time. He opts for Georg Hegel’s view of motion,
which Hegel attributed to Zeno (Priest, 2006, 175). It is an intrinsic view too.
Here is how Hegel explains it:
Something moves, not because now it is here and there at another now,
but because in one and the same now it is here and not here; because
in this here it is and is not at the same time. One must concede to the
dialecticians of old the contradictions which they pointed to in motion;
but what follows from them is not that motion is not but that it is
rather contradiction as existent. (Hegel, 2010, 382)
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Something moves because at one and the same moment it is here and not here. If a
body a is in motion, then it will be in different places at different times and it will
both occupy a location and not occupy it at that time. (Priest, 2006, 175) says that
this second inconsistent, but necessary condition on motion is needed because
without it, awould not be distinguishable “from a body occupying different places
at different times, but at rest at each of these instants.” And an intrinsic view of
motion requires such a distinction.
However, there is a strong intuition that rest and motion are mutually exclu-
sive states of an object. Also, another kind of worry is from explanatory parsi-
mony. Priest affirms that if something is in motion, then it has non-zero velocity.
And he affirms that if something has non-zero velocity, then it is in motion.28 But
Mortensen (2015) argues that “if non-zero (speed or acceleration) is necessary and
sufficient for motion, then the extra element of inconsistency would seem to be ex-
planatorily otiose, since there is no need to add the extra element of inconsistency
in order to constitute motion.”
Moreover, Priest does not mention the impetus theory. He only argues against
the at-at or cinematic theory, and argues for his intrinsic one. Even if we ignore
any other difficulties of Priest’s account, Tahko (2009, 42) concludes that “the
changes required by the impetus theory are less fundamental than the ones re-
quired by Priest’s theory,” and so, on balance, the impetus theory is preferable to
Priest’s theory. So, a proponent of LNC4 need not be committed to an inconsistent
theory of motion.
28Ibid., 298, fn. 28.
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2.1.2.1.6 Interpretations from quantum mechanics
Another kind of possible challenge to LNC4 that Tahko mentions comes from
quantum mechanics.
First, there is an incompatibility between standard quantum mechanics and
classical logic generally. Bueno & Colyvan (2004, 159-160) provide a simple ex-
ample. By quantum mechanics, any electron e has a spin in a given direction x.
Recall that earlier we said that electrons are fermions, that is, they have a spin of
either 1/2 or -1/2. They say that we can name the spin of e in the x direction by
ex. Then this is a true disjunction:
ex = 1/2∨ ex = −1/2
Now assume that x and y are distinct directions and that we measured e’s spin
in x and yielded that ‘ex = 1/2’ is true. Then because the other disjunction ‘ey =
1/2∨ ey = −1/2’ is true too, we can introduce the conjunction:
(i) ex = 1/2∧ (ey = 1/2∨ ey = −1/2)
And by the distributive laws of classical logic, specially the distributivity of
conjunction over disjunction, α∧ (β∨γ)↔ (α∧β)∨ (α∧γ), it follows from (i) that
(ii) (ex = 1/2∧ ey = 1/2)∨ (ex = 1/2∧ ey = −1/2)
‘Either the spin of e in x is 1/2 but in y is 1/2 or the spin of e in x is 1/2 but in y
is -1/2.’ But Bueno and Colyvan point out that by standard (Copenhagen) quan-
tum mechanics in which Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle holds, this is false
because it is impossible to measure the spin of an electron in distinct directions
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at the same time.29 So, the classical distributive laws do not hold at the quantum
level.
But others go so far as to claim that LNC too is incompatible with standard
quantum mechanics. There are superpositions in quantum mechanics that might
involve contradictions. Schrödinger’s cat paradox involves a state of superposi-
tion in which the cat is simultaneously both dead and not dead (that is, alive).
Arenhart & Krause (2014) argue that it is difficult to make sense of the claim that
there are contradictions in the case of quantum superpositions and that from a
metaphysical point of view, there are obstacles to such a suggestion.
Still, as Bueno & Colyvan (2004, 160) indicate, one can opt for an alternative
interpretation of quantum mechanics, for example, a Bohmian interpretation, and
reject standard quantum mechanics. The Bohmian interpretation does not imply
that reality is in violation of LNC. After all, as Cushing (1994) argues, Bohm’s
interpretation equally well explains the observational data. The Copenhagen view
is now standard because it happened to appear first — an historical accident.
Moreover, Tahko (2009, 43) concludes, “Presently, it is not even entirely clear that
quantum mechanics can be understood to pose a challenge to LNC.”
So, until more information comes out that might call LNC4 into question, we
are free to reject metaphysical dialetheism. So, LNC4 is actually true.
2.1.3 LNC is necessarily true
But what does it mean to say that LNC4 is necessarily true and not merely actually
true? Here is a provisional definition of necessary truth that is similar to Tahko
(2014, 239)’s metaphysical definition of logical truth:
(ML) A statement is necessarily true if and only if it is true in every
29Ibid.
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genuinely possible configuration of the world.
ML preserves the Aristotelian intuition of a statement’s being true if its content
‘corresponds’ appropriately with reality. A configuration of the world is genuinely
possible if it “could have turned out to correspond with the world.”30
With ML at his service, Tahko weakens Aristotle’s own formulation of LNC4
by adding a qualification:
The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to
the same subject in the same respect and in the same domain. (Tahko,
2014, 239)
The domain of the qualification ‘in the same domain’ is the collection of genuinely
possible configurations of the world.
Tahko argues that genuine possibilities should be understood in terms of meta-
physical possibilities.31 What is it that assures the the correspondence between
the structure of reality and any given possible world? For Tahko, the metaphys-
ical modal space consists of all possible configurations of the world and nothing
else. Of course, there are non-genuinely possible configurations of the world in
wider modal spaces. He illustrates this with an example of an a posteriori neces-
sity. It is logically possible for gold to fail to be the element with atomic number
79, but is not metaphysically possible. Saul Kripke (1980, 116) called this kind
of statement a “theoretical identification.” Edward Zalta (1988, 72) too observes
that “Identity statements involving rigid names and descriptions are examples of
necessary truths that are not logically true.” So, Tahko concludes, there are nec-
essary constraints on the structure of reality, but logical necessity fails to capture
it.32
30Ibid.
31Ibid., 241.
32Ibid.
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2.1.3.1 Against the necessary truth of LNC
Now recall absolutism, the view that there are true contradictions at a metaphys-
ically possible world. Absolutism is incompatible with the LNC as necessarily
true. Luis Estrada-González (2014) argues for absolutism. Specifically, his case
includes the claim that the validity of the Aristotelian LNC does not prevent the
existence of dialetheias. He presents an argument inspired by Tahko with the
conclusion that realist dialetheism (his name for metaphysical dialetheism) is im-
possible. But before he does that, he states Berto’s definition of negation, which is
built upon Grim’s. Let’s look at Grim’s and then Berto’s definitions.
2.1.3.1.1 Berto’s exclusion-expressing tool
Recall that a contradictory state of affairs or an inconsistent object would be
one in which something both had a specific property but also lacked that property.
Or it can be something that both had a specific property but also had a property
that is incompatible with the first. In this second case, the material incompatibility
or material exclusivity of the properties is what is fundamentally doing the exclud-
ing, not the negation statement operator of logic. Berto (2008, 180) uses the term
‘material’ because the relation stems from the material content of the properties.
The realtion is not merely logical in the sense of ‘formal.’
Grim (2004, sec. 4) uses this second case to characterized negation in terms of
the intuitive, primitive notion of exclusion. The exclusionary class of a property
P is the collection of all properties that are materially incompatible with P .33 He
introduces the symbol “not,” and so something is not-P1 if and only if it has some
property P2, that is materially incompatible with P1. So, we can enter Grim’s LNC
version in Berto’s taxonomy:
33Ibid., 63.
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(LNC4c) ∀x∀P1∀P2[(P1 ∧ P2 are incompatible)→¬(P1x∧ P2x)]
“For any individual x, property P1 and property P2, if P1 and P2 are incompatible
then it is not the case that both x has P1 and x has P2.”
Berto (2008) builds off of Grim’s not, to introduce his exclusion-expressing
tool NOT. We all, including dialetheists, have an intuition of material incompat-
ibility.34 Our “apprehension of incompatibility is more primitive than the use of
negation.”35 Huw Price offers an evolutionary story of the origins of such appre-
hension:
We often find ourselves faced with a choice between performing and
not performing a specified action. Not all choices are like this. Some-
times we have two or more options, each independently described in
positive terms. But at other times nature offers us an opportunity, and
our choice is simply to accept or to decline. To have a sense that there
is a decision to be made in such a case seems already to have a sense
of the incompatibility of the options. Once language comes to be asso-
ciated with the activity of agents, there is thus a need for negation in
formulating, offering, and expressing choices. (Price, 1990, 226)
His idea is that when we are faced with a choice we perceive an incompatibility.
We recognize the boundary between something and something else, between one
state of affairs and another, between a property and a different one. Negation
comes later, when we learn how to use language.
Grim (2004, 63)’s examples of incompatibilities are the property of being uni-
formly red only and the property of being uniformly green only, and the properties
of being less than two inches long and being more than three feet long. These prop-
erties are exclusive because the possession of one by some object excludes the
possession of the other by that object. A property can exclude multiple other
34Ibid., 179.
35Ibid.
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properties from being possessed. The property less than two inches long excludes
a range of incompatible properties, such as, more than one foot long, more than two
foot long, more than three feet long, etc. Generally, all those properties incompatible
with a some property P are in the exclusionary class of P .
Berto (2008, 181) offers his first attempt at formalizing his NOT:
NOT P1(x) =df ∃P2(P2(x)∧ P1⊥P2)
where ⊥ is a binary relation of material exclusion. ‘x is NOT P1’ just is to say that
‘there is some other property P2 such that x has it and which is materially exclusive
with respect to P1.’ He illustrates with a car and its colors. To say that ‘The car
is NOT blue’ just means that ‘The car has some property incompatible with that
of being blue,’ without specification of which property. He indicates that this is
the logically weakest statement which is incompatible with the former. ‘The car
is red’ is stronger because contains the addition information of specifying which
color.
Berto (2008, 187) then can express LNC with his NOT. He uses a different
translation of Aristotle’s formulation from the Metaphysics where the Greek ‘ady-
naton’ is translated as ‘impossible’:
For the same thing to hold good and NOT hold good simultaneously
of the same thing and in the same respect is impossible [adynaton].
‘P1 does NOT hold good of x’ abbreviates ‘to x has some property P2, which is
materially incompatible with P1.’ So, we have it that it is impossible for P1 to
belong to x and P2, which is materially incompatible with P1, to also belong to x
simultaneously and in the same respect. Of course, Berto characterizes his NOT
in terms of metaphysical possibility. As we have seen with Tahko, the right level
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modality here is the metaphysical kind. So, we can restate it using Tahko’s modal
phrase:
There is no genuinely possible configuration of the world in which for
any individual x and any properties P1 and P2, P1 belongs to x and P2,
which is materially incompatible with P1, also belongs to x simultane-
ously and in the same respect.
Berto argues that the dialetheist cannot also coherently accept claims inconsistent
with his Aristotelian formulation of LNC.
Priest and other dialetheists need an exclusion-expressing tool too, but to
avoid trivialism. In Priest’s paraconsistent logic, the Logic of Paradox (LP), there
is a model of it, namely the trivial model, in which it is logically possible that ev-
ery statement is true, because if all atomic statements are both true and false, then
all statements are true and false. As Berto (2008, 170) notes, “nothing is ruled out
on logical grounds only in the dialetheic framework.” But for Priest, the challenge
of ruling things out can be met in the realm of pragmatics. The pragmatic op-
erator for rejection is what does the excluding work of negation. Recall LNC3b:
¬(`x α∧ ax α). x cannot simultaneously both accept and reject α. Priest would
accept this formulation because acceptance and rejection are doing the exclusion-
ary work (although they are not exhaustive because someone can be an agnostic,
holding the only third possible stance). He explains like this:
Someone who rejects A cannot simultaneously accept it any more than
a person can simultaneously catch a bus and miss it, or win a game of
chess and lose it. If a person is asked whether or notA, he can of course
say “Yes and no.” However this does not show that he both accepts and
rejects A. It means that he accepts both A and its negation. Moreover a
person can alternate between accepting and rejecting a claim. He can
also be undecided as to which to do. But do both he can not. (Priest,
1989, 618)
32
The dialetheist may not be able to exclude α by affirming “¬α” because α and its
negation are not mutually exclusive for them. But they can exclude α by rejecting
α.
But then, for Berto (2006, 291), the question becomes: what exactly is accepted
by someone who accepts a dialetheist’s denial? A denial conveys information.
Information is conveyed by a pragmatic speech act if it excludes some content.
Grim (2004, 62) puts the problem this way:
If dialetheism has so much going for it, why stop it short of assertion
and denial? It is also unclear that exclusion can be restricted to the
pragmatics of assertion and denial alone. Given that the dialetheist
can deny certain claims, including the LNC, what is the information
that he conveys by his denial? If we accept his denial, what precisely
is it that we have accepted? If we learn that he is right, what precisely
is it that we have learned? All these questions reflect the fact that a
denial is intended to convey some content. But any content that in-
herits the exclusionary characteristics that Priest recognizes for denial
will thereby have precisely the exclusionary characteristics he refuses
to recognize for negation.
If Priest excludes the statement ‘She catches the bus’ by saying that he denies it,
then there is some deeper kind of exclusion going on. The content of ‘She catches
the bus’ is materially incompatible with the content of ‘She misses the bus.’ The
dialetheist understands material exclusion. So, they also understand Berto’s NOT.
For (Berto, 2008, 166), they are committed to accepting it “without also accepting
something inconsistent with it, on pain of trivialism.”
2.1.3.1.2 Absolutism
Now that we are familiar with Berto’s definition of NOT and formulation of
LNC4, we can return to Estrada-González’s case for absolutism. He states the
principle of exclusion as follows:
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(PE) It is impossible for an entity to be P and to be NOT P . (Estrada-
González, 2014, 201)
in the sense of Berto’s NOT. And then he states his Tahko inspired argument
against the possibility of metaphysical dialetheism:
(T1) According to realist dialetheism, there are contradictions in real-
ity.
(T2) But the principle of exclusion is valid, i.e. an entity cannot have
two mutually exclusive properties.
(T3) Therefore, realist dialetheism is impossible.36
He accepts the truth of the premises but rejects the argument’s validity. He
claims that to be valid an additional premise must be added:
(T2*) All (metaphysical) contradictions are exclusions.37
He proceeds to argue that this premise is false because there can be dialetheias
even though a modified PE is valid. For him, “certain abstracta could give rise to
dialetheias.”38
But a proponent of LNC4 is free to reject his version of PE. He also redefines
negation which is not equivalent to the most prominent paraconsistent negation,
which is of Priest’s LP. For Estrada-Gonzalez falsity is not the truth of negation.
But, as we saw earlier, Fdαe ↔ T d¬αe is widely accepted by both supporters and
critics of LNC. LNC2a, ¬(T dαe∧Fdαe), and LNC2b, ¬(T dαe∧T d¬αe), are taken to
be equivalent. So, for Estrada-Gonzalez, the usual characterizations of dialetheias
“‘the conjunction (or each member of the pair) p and not-p is true’ and ‘p is both
36Ibid., 202.
37Ibid., 203.
38Ibid., 213.
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true and false’ are not equivalent” (Estrada-González, 2014, 208, f. 12). So, other
dialetheists are free to reject his version of negation.
In any case, even if a dialetheist can be justified in his belief that there are
abstract inconsistent objects, they would be committed to the view that the actual
world is an impossible world. Martin (2014) presents the dilemma that either the
dialetheist accept that their research program of trying to solve the self-referential
paradoxes comprehensively is not possible or concede that the actual world is
an impossible world. I will briefly look at the latter horn. Martin defines the
impossibility of a world: “[A]n impossible world is a world w where propositions
that cannot possibly be true are true.”39 So, he infers,any w where a contradiction
is true will be an impossible world. Now recall Martin’s definition of absolutism:
There are true contradictions at a metaphysically possible world. The absolutist
must admit that some impossible worlds are possible worlds.
Yet to admit that some impossible worlds are also possible worlds seems
to strip impossibility of the theoretical role that the concept plays. If
a world w’s being an impossible world doesn’t preclude that it’s also a
possible world, then it’s unclear what function the concept of impos-
sibility serves. [..] [T]he absolutist would be taking on the burden of
explaining what theoretical role the concept of impossibility plays if it
doesn’t preclude possibility. (Martin, 2014, 66)
What is more, Martin argues that if possibility and impossibility intersect,
the absolutist cannot prevent the actual world from being an impossible one.40
Estrada-Gonzalez’s inconsistent objects are abstract and so would exist in every
possible world. But dialetheism and absolutism are compatible. So, there would
be a contradiction in the actual world. So, the actual world would be an impossi-
ble one. Martin observes that this is perplexing because an impossible world is a
39Ibid., 66.
40Ibid., 66.
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world that could not be actualized, but the actual world is actualized.41 If there
is anything that we can say about the actual world, it is that it is not impossible.
Priest would rather say that contradictions are possible, that is, true contradic-
tions at the actual world do not entail that the actual world is an impossible world
(Priest et al., 2004, 177, f. 5). But consider his definition: “an impossible world is
one where the laws of logic are different from those of the actual world (in the way
that a physically impossible world is a world where the laws of physics are differ-
ent from those of the actual world)” (Priest, 2014, xxiii). Martin points out that it
is not clear how Priest’s and other prominent dialetheists’ definitions of impossi-
ble worlds and states of affairs “can plausibly accommodate the impossibility of
the actual world.”
So, we are free to reject absolutism and thus accept that Berto’s modal LNC4
is necessarily true.
2.1.4 LNC is a proposition
LNC4 governs the structure of any metaphysically possible world. It is true in
every such world. But what kind of thing is a truth? I argue that if LNC exists
then it is a proposition.
A truth is something that bears a truth value and that value is true. A falsehood
is something that bears a truth value and that value is false. There are four main
candidates in the literature for truthbearers: beliefs, propositions, sentences, and
utterances. A belief is something that is in some sense in the mind and that we
accept as true. But this something is a truthbearer. So, a belief bears truth in a
derived sense. So, this more fundamental truthbearer is either a proposition, a
sentence or an utterance. An utterance is a specific event, that is, the intentional
41Ibid.
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act of a speaker at a specific time and location, and they typically involve lan-
guage. But an utterance, whether it is written or spoken, is an act or event, and
acts and events do not bear truth. They either or occur or not. The act of my
writing down the sentence ‘Snow is white’ on a piece of paper is not true or false.
But the sentence itself may be true or false.
A sentence is a sequence of words, and words are linguistic objects. They are
part of a language. A language is something that consists of words in a structured
and conventional way. But LNC4 cannot be restricted to being a mere sentence.
After all, it can be expressed with different sequences of words, as we have seen
earlier. Also, there are metaphysically possible worlds in which there is no lan-
guage and hence in which there are no sentences. Max Black’s famous world in
which there are just two qualitatively identical symmetrical spheres contains no
words. But LNC4 is true in every such world and so it is true in that one too. The
best candidate, at least by the process of elimination, is that LNC4 is a propo-
sition. Propositions are typically held to be the primary bearers of truth value.
They are the primary bears of truth in that any other kind of thing that wants
truth must have it in virtue of expressing a true proposition.
2.1.4.1 There are propositions
There are, of course, independent reasons for thinking that there are propositions.
We may want to posit their existence to play some of the the following roles: to
be the objects of belief and other ‘propositional attitudes’ (what McGrath (2014)
calls the ‘Metaphysics 101 argument’), to be the referents of that-clauses (so-called
‘metalinguistic arguments’) and the meanings of sentences (a solution to a kind
of ‘one over many’ problem for synonymous sentences).
But I find arguments from Trenton Merricks (2015, ch. 1) for their existence
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and nature appealing, and one such argument suffices for our purposes. The start-
ing point of his argument is that there are modally valid arguments. He defines
the modal validity condition for arguments: “An argument is modally valid just
in case, necessarily, if its premises are true, then its conclusion is true.”42 But
arguments are constituted by premises and a conclusion. So, such constituents
exist. He calls these premises and conclusions ‘propositions’ because they have
certain properties: they exist necessarily, have their truth conditions essentially,
are the fundamental truthbearers, among other properties. To illustrate, he has
us consider this famous argument:
(1) All men are mortal.
(2) Socrates is a man.
(3) So, Socrates is mortal.43
This is modally valid because, necessarily, if (1) and (2) are true, then (3) is true. A
critic might suggest that (1)-(3) is only logically valid. Modal validity and logical
validity are different concepts. The former is defined in terms of necessity, and
the latter in terms of form. But Merricks argues, in his second chapter, that there
are logically valid arguments only if there are modally valid ones. I will briefly
sketch his argument.
The following argument is not logically valid:
Cicero is an orator.
Therefore, Tully is an orator.44
That is, it is not valid simply in virtue of its form. Its predicate logic form is a is
F; therefore, b is F. But no argument of that form is logically valid. Merricks has
42Ibid., 1.
43Ibid., 3.
44Ibid., 35.
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us imagine a model that assign ‘a’ to himself, ‘b’ to his daughter and ‘F’ to the set
of males. In this model ‘a is F’ is true but ‘b is F’ is false.45 So, there is a model
in which the conclusion is not true but the premise is. So, it is not logically valid.
So, it is not logically valid.
In contrast,
Cicero is an orator.
Therefore, Cicero is an orator.46
is logically valid, both in predicate and sentential logics. And the argument com-
posed of propositions
That Cicero/Tully is an orator
Therefore, That Cicero/Tully is an orator47
is modally valid, that is, necessarily, if the premise is true than the conclusion is
too. For Merricks, because propositions are the primary truthbearers, a sentence
is true (in a context of use) only if it expresses a true proposition. All of the
members of the first two arguments express the same proposition that Cicero/Tully
is an orator, which is a member of the third argument. But logical validity involves
truth preservation from the premise(s) to the conclusion. So, the second argument
is logically valid just in case “its form guarantees that the sentence that is its
premise expresses a true proposition only if the sentence that is its conclusion
expresses a true proposition.”48
45Ibid., 36.
46Ibid., 39.
47Ibid., 41.
48Ibid., 39.
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So, it is not enough to say that the argument (1)-(3) is merely logically valid.
It is modally valid. So, there is a modally valid argument. But it has constituents:
premises and a conclusion. So, there are premises and a conclusion.
These premises and a conclusion (of a modally valid argument) would either
be propositions or sentences. Merricks argues for the former. Sentences do not
have their truth conditions essentially. Sentences can change their meaning, and
they can change in their truth conditions, because their constitute words can
change their meanings.49 But Merricks points out that something cannot change
with respect to its essential properties. There is no possible state of affairs in
which I do not have the property of being human because I possess it essentially.
Merricks gives the example of the semantic drift of the word ‘guy.’50 It once meant
a sculpture of a person. So, the sentence ‘A guy is on the street’ once meant that a
sculpture of a person is on the street. And, presumably, at that same time, ‘A
human being is on the street’ meant that a human being is on the street. So, the
argument with sentences,
‘A guy is on the street’
So, ‘A human being is on the street’51
is not modally valid, because it is possible that the premise, which expresses a
sculpture of a person is on the street, is true but the conclusion, which expresses a
human being is on the street, is false. But this argument,
A guy is on the street.
So, A human being is on the street.52
49Ibid., 5.
50Ibid., 5
51Ibid., 6.
52Ibid.
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is modally valid, but it is not composed of the aforementioned sentences. So,
Merricks infers that it does not have sentences as its premise and conclusion. So,
modally valid arguments do not have sentences as their constituents. Of course,
the only other viable kind of candidate are propositions. So, there are proposi-
tions.
So, we have good reason to think that there are propositions and that LNC4 is
one of them.
2.2 If LNC is a necessarily true proposition, then it necessarily exists
We also have good reason to think that if something has a property or stands in a
relation to other things then it exists. If this apple is red, that is, it has the property
of redness, then the apple exists. If two oranges are zero distance from each other,
that is, they stand in the relation of physical contact with each other, then they
exist. Plantinga (1983, 4) calls this ‘serious actualism.’ He explains actualism tout
court first:
The actualist does not hold that everything is actual (he recognizes,
of course, that some states of affairs are not actual and some proposi-
tions are false); what he holds is that everything exists (again, quantifier
taken unrestrictedly); there are no things that do not exist. (Plantinga,
1987, 196)
Actualism in this sense is intuitive enough. So, I will assume it for present pur-
poses. But serious actualism is more substantial. Plantinga defines it this way:
The serious actualist holds, naturally enough, that everything what-
ever exists, but he adds that nothing has properties in worlds in which
it does not exist. That is, for any world w, if Socrates has a property in
w, then Socrates exists in w; for any world w, if w is such that if it had
been actual, then Socrates would have had P , then w is such that if it
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had been actual Socrates would have existed. Still another way to put
it: Socrates could not have had a property without existing. 53
Yannis Stephanou (2007, 219) provides a nice formulation of it which reveals its
logical structure:
(SA1) (∀x)(∀P )(x has P → Ex)
The box ‘’ symbol represents metaphysical necessity (‘in every metaphysically
possible world’), ‘P ’ ranges over properties and ‘E’ is the existence predicate mean-
ing ‘exists.’ For any individual x and property P , necessarily, if x has P then it
exists.54
But what about the property of not existing, the complement of existing? If
there is such a property and it is exemplifiable, then it would seem to act as a
counterexample to SA1. Stephanou observes that such a supposed property is
frequently cited as such a counterexample.55 He illustrates it this way. Socrates is
a contingent being. So, there is a possible world w in which he does not exist. So,
at w he has the property of nonexistence. So, he has some property at w. But by
SA1, then, he exists at w, because he has a property. So, Socrates both exists and
does not exist at w. But this is impossible.
Of course, the important inference is the one from that there are worlds in which
Socrates does not exist to that in those worlds he has the property of nonexistence. But
Plantinga offers an actualist argument for the invalidity of this inference, specif-
ically, that nonexistence cannot be exemplified. So, if you are an actualist, then
you should also be a serious actualist. Here is how he formulates his argument:
53Ibid., 197.
54He also introduces a parallel principle for relations, where R ranges over relations: (SA2)
(∀x)(∀y)(∀R)(x bearsR to y→ Ex) (Ibid.). For any individuals x and y and relation R, necessarily,
if x bears R to y then it exists.
55Ibid., 223.
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(1) Necessarily, for any property P , if P is exemplified, then there is
something that exemplifies it,
(2) Necessarily, for any property P , whatever exemplifies P exists.
(3) Necessarily, if nonexistence is exemplified, it is exemplified by some-
thing that exists. Plantinga (1987, 197-198)
Premise (1) is obvious. To be exemplified is to be exemplified by something.
Plantinga indicates that “(2) is an immediate consequence of actualism.”56 For
by actualism, necessarily, everything exists. So, necessarily, everything that ex-
emplifies properties exists. (1) and (2) entail that necessarily, for any property P ,
if P is exemplified, it is exemplified by something that exists. And we see that
we get conclusion (3) when we replace the property variable ‘P ’ with ‘nonexis-
tence.’ (3) states a necessary condition for the exemplification of nonexistence: it
can only be exemplified by something that exists. But existence and nonexistence
are complements, that is, they are mutually exclusive properties. So, Plantinga
concludes, something that exists cannot also exemplify nonexistence.57 So, it is
impossible that nonexistence is exemplified. So, the counterexample to serious
actualism is not successful.
So, serious actualism is defensible. If something has a property or stands in
a relation to other things then it exists. So, if LNC4 is actually true, that is, the
property of being actually true is exemplified by LNC4, then it actually exists. Re-
call that we are working with absolute truth, which is a property of objects, not
relative truth which is not. Moreover, if LNC4 is necessarily true, that is, it is
true in ever metaphysically possible world, then it has the property of being true in
every such world.58 So, if it exists in every such world, then it necessarily exists.
56Ibid., 197.
57Ibid.,198.
58A&W’s version of this premise is criticized by Nathan Shannon (2012, 4, 5): “To be true in
a possible world, a proposition must exist in that world; to be true of or at a possible world, the
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Moreover, if it necessarily exists then it is not a physical object, because the set of
all physically possible worlds is a proper subset of all the metaphysically possible
ones. So, there are metaphysically possible worlds that contain no physical objects
yet LNC4 exists in them too.
2.3 LNC necessarily exists
We now have our first two premises (M1) LNC is a necessarily true proposition
and (M2) If LNC is a necessarily true proposition, then it necessarily exists. So,
by modus ponens, we have (M3) LNC necessarily exists.
proposition need only describe that world. A proposition can be true of a possible world without
existing in it. AW blur this distinction.” But Anderson & Welty (2013, 11) point out that if α is true
of w, that is, describes w truly, then α would be true if w were the actual world. But a proposition
cannot be true if it does not exist, as has been argued. So, A&W infer that if α does not exist in w,
then α would not be true even if w were the actual world.
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3 SECOND HALF OF ARGUMENT
In this major section, I defend the remaining premises. For the most part, I will
follow A&W.
(M4) All propositions are thoughts.
(M5) So, LNC is a necessarily existent, true thought. (from M1, M3
and M4)
(M6) If LNC is a necessarily existent, true thought, then there is a nec-
essarily existent mind.
(M7) So, there is a necessarily existent mind. (from M5 and M6)
3.1 All propositions are thoughts
We saw from Merricks’ argument for propositions that propositions have certain
properties. They are the fundamental bearers of truth and falsity, they can be
expressed by sentences, etc. But I did not mention that, from his arguments,
propositions have the characteristic of representing things in a certain way. A
proposition is true because it represents things as being a certain way and things
are that way. And a proposition is false because it represents things as being
a certain way but things are not that way. What is more, from his arguments,
propositions also essentially represent things as being a certain way (Merricks,
2015, 21).
The characteristic of representing things as being a certain way falls under the
term ‘intentionality.’ It ultimately derives from the Latin verb intendere, which
means being directed towards something. In his 1874 book Psychology from an Em-
pirical Point of View, Franz Brentano introduced this concept to contemporary phi-
losophy. Here is the oft-quoted passage:
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Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of
the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an
object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously,
reference to a content, direction toward an object [...]. Every mental
phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they
do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is pre-
sented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in
hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (Brentano, 2009, 68)
So, intentionality consists of two characteristics: direction toward an object and
direction in a specific way. Anderson & Welty (2011, 333-5) call these directedness
and aspectual shape, respectively. “Dublin is the capital and largest city of Ire-
land” has directedness because it is directed toward Dublin. The two statements
“The morning star is Venus" and “The evening star is Venus” are both directed
toward the same object, namely, Venus. But the statements have different aspec-
tual shapes; they are directed toward that planet in different ways. The former
presents Venus as the brightest object in the early morning sky, and the latter does
so as the brightest object in the evening one. The sentences, though, are deriva-
tively intentional because they are intentional in virtue of expressing propositions
which have directedness and aspectual shape. Propositions are intrinsically in-
tentional.
A&W then point out that some mental entities (or thoughts) also exhibit in-
tentionality. Beliefs, hopes, desires, fears, and so forth are typically about things
(directedness) and they are so in particular ways (aspectual shape).1 My desire
for vanilla bean ice cream is for ice cream (directedness) and to eat it (aspec-
tual shape). A&W contrast this with nonmental entities. Rocks, pianos, galaxies,
lamps, etc. do not exhibit directedness and aspectual shape. If physical marks
on a piece of paper can be said to exhibit such, then it does so derivatively, rather
1Ibid., 334.
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than intrinsically, because it would be depend on the prior activity of some mind.
A&W conclude that if there were no mind to confer meaning on physical marks,
then the marks would not be about anything, because only a mind has the intrinsic
power to direct thoughts. And it is obvious that thoughts exist.
So, both propositions and thoughts exist and exhibit intentionally. A&W ask
us, How then should we fit propositions in our ontology?2 They are either in an
already existing ontological category or in their own. They argue that the first
option is more simple and less arbitrary. In the absence of any good reason for
believing that propositions are not mental, then we are free to assume that they
are. We do not need to create a separate, unique category for them in our ontology.
So, we assume that propositions are thoughts. So, LNC is a thought.
3.2 Against propositions as thoughts
Alexander Paul Bozzo (2012) offers an objection to this premise. Specifically, he
offers a counterexample in which a proposition is intentional without there being
a mind doing the directing. If successful it would show that a proposition can be
intentional and also not be mental.
Suppose that Romulus is ignorant of which explorer discovered the
Pacific Ocean. Nevertheless, he recognizes that some explorer did in
fact discover it, and asserts that “The explorer who discovered the Pa-
cific Ocean was adventurous.” Now the proposition expressed by this
sentence—in particular, the definite description imbedded therein—
is about Vasco Núñez de Balboa, and as such successfully refers. But
here the definite description refers despite Romulus’s ignorance; that
is, independent of his mind’s doing the directing. (Bozzo, 2012, 4)
Anderson & Welty (2013, 5) respond to this example. First, they identify that
Bozzo offers no good reason to think that Romulus’s assertion cannot be about
2Ibid., 335.
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Balboa because of Romulus’s mental activity. Romulus uses the description “the
explorer who discovered the Pacific Ocean” to refer to the object that has the prop-
erty of being the explorer who discovered the Pacific Ocean, and that object just so
happens to be called “Balboa.” So, the assertion is about the person with this de-
scription and name. But A&W indicate that just because the description refers
despite Romulus’s ignorance, does not mean that it refers apart from Romulus’s
intentional activity. If he had not used the description to refer at all, there would
be no reference. Use of a linguistic object to refer to other objects is an example of
mental activity.
More importantly, A&W point out that even if the proposition expressed by
Romulus’s assertion were intentional apart from his mental activity, then it would
not follow that the proposition could have intentionality apart from any men-
tal activity. To assume that there is no mind whatsoever doing the directing is
question begging. “[O]ur argument does not depend on the claim that if a mind
entertains a proposition then the intentionality of that proposition derives solely
(or even partly) from that mind.”3 Rather, it depends on the claim that the inten-
tionality of a proposition depends on some mind.
Another case that has been raised against M4 is by Colin P. Ruloff (2014). He
argues that a broadly Fregean account of propositions is true and that on such an
account propositions are mind-independent. He then argues that A&W’s claim that
propositional conceptualism is the least arbitrary is mistaken. He summarizes the
Fregean account:
Fregean propositional realism (FPR): Propositions are abstract, mind and
language-independent, truth-bearing, representational entities, that
function as the referents of propositional attitude reports and the mean-
3Ibid.
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ings of declarative sentence-tokens.4
Ruloff argues that propositions are mind-independent for Frege because a propo-
sition can be believed and expressed by two different persons uttering different
sentences of different languages.5 He gives an example of a proposition that is
shared by two different people. Jones assents to ‘Snow is white,’ while Smith
assents to ‘Schnee ist weiss.’ Hence, their mental states are different. But both
believe the same proposition, namely, that Snow is white. It acts as the content of
their respective beliefs. So, it is intersubjectively shareable across Jones’ mind and
Smith’s mind. So, Ruloff concludes that it is not identical to the particular mental
states corresponding to their beliefs. Propositions are intentional “independently
of the cognitive activities of the agents who entertain them.”6
Another argument Ruloff gives for why propositions are not mental is that “the
representational properties of mental states is best explained in terms of the rep-
resentational properties of propositions which serve as their contents.”7 To support
this claim, he asserts that Scott Soames has “suggested just this line of reasoning,”
and he cites a passage from Soames:
[P]ropositions are the primary bearers of intentionality, the intention-
ality and truth conditions of cognitive acts or states must be explained
in terms of quasi-perceptual relations we bear to propositions. For
Frege and Russell, all intentionality originates and is grounded in an
abstract “third realm.” (Soames, 2014, 26)
Here is another passage from Soames’ work that Ruloff does not refer to:
4Ibid., 46.
5Ibid.
6Ibid., 47.
7Ibid., 45.
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The most general form of the problem is to explain how propositions
[...] manage to represent the world, and so have truth conditions. Al-
though many things have truth conditions—including sentences, ut-
terances, and mental states—the standard explanation for this is that
they do so because they express propositions that are inherently rep-
resentational, and so have truth conditions independent of us. Soames
(2014, 33)
Although A&W have not published a response to Ruloff’s arguments, I think
that Ruloff’s arguments and Bozzo’s argument suffer from a similar defect: they
fail to show that propositions exist independently of any mind. His first argu-
ment only shows that there is a proposition that exists independently of the minds
of Jones and Smith. For the second argument, recall Soames’ first passage. The
“cognitive acts or states” that he mentions belong to us humans by his use of the
word “we.” Likewise for the other passage: the “mental states” that get their
“truth conditions” from propositions are ours, given his use of “us.” Of course,
that propositions exist independently of human minds is compatible with M4 be-
cause human minds do not exhaust the full range of minds.
Ruloff then goes on to point out that A&W believe M4 because they state that
we do not have “good independent reason for insisting that propositions are not
mental items” and that M4 is the “simplest and least arbitrary” (Anderson &
Welty, 2011, 334-335). To try to counter the first of these claims, Ruloff (2014,
48) appeals to the “singular term argument” (STA) for the existence of proposi-
tions.
Step One In sentences containing “that”-clauses, the “that” clause is
naturally taken to be a singular term or referring expression. [...]
Step Two The most plausible referents for such clauses are propositions
construed specifically as mind-independent, non-spatiotemporal, ab-
stract objects.
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He observes that support for Step One is given by this kind of argument:
(5) Jones believes that snow is white.
(6) Therefore, Jones believes something.8
And its validity, for STA proponents, is explained in terms of existential general-
ization:
(7) Jones believes the referent of “that snow is white”.
(8) Therefore, there exists something such that Jones believes it.
So, “that snow is white” is a singular term that refers to some specific object.9
Ruloff concludes that if Step Two is true too, that is, non-propositional accounts
of referents for “that”-clauses are not plausible, then there are propositions.10
But I think that this argument is compatible with M4 if we construe Step Two
as this: The most plausible referents for such clauses are propositions construed
specifically as human-mind-independent, non-spatiotemporal, abstract objects.11
Indeed, we can interpret FPR similarly as this: Non-human propositional realism
(NPR): Propositions are abstract, human-mind and language-independent, truth-
bearing, representational entities, that function as the referents of propositional
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11It could be objected that Frege’s concept of abstraction is not compatible with even divine
mentality. Gideon Rosen (2014, sec. 3) points out that for Frege abstract objects are distinguished
from concrete objects by abstract objects’ lacking certain concrete properties. He formulates it this
way: “An object is abstract if and only if it is both non-mental and non-sensible.” God would be
concrete, and the thoughts of a concrete being are themselves concrete. LNC4, for instance, would
be concrete if acausality is necessary for abstraction because LNC4 is not acausal — it constrains
the structure of reality. So, God’s thoughts cannot be abstract objects. So, divine conceptualism is
incompatible with FPR.
But a proponent of divine conceptualism can subscribe to a functionalist account of “abstract
objects,” according to which divine thoughts play the role of whatever is considered to fall under
the category of “abstract propositions.” Welty (2014, 95, fn. 2.) indicates that such a view is
“compatible with a wide variety of ontological specifications.”
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attitude reports and the meanings of declarative sentence-tokens. So far the only
kind of minds that Ruloff’s arguments exclude are human ones.
Finally, to combat A&W’s claim that M4 is the “simplest and least arbitrary”,
Ruloff states that mind-independent propositions perform important explanatory
work, and such explanatory power justifies the violation of the principle of par-
simony,12 according to which we should not multiply ontological kinds beyond
explanatory necessity. He appeals to his earlier arguments. FPR provides a plau-
sible explanation of how the same proposition can be believed and expressed by
different people uttering different sentence of different languages.13 But I think
that there is no good reason why a view consistent with NPR cannot explain the
same phenomenon. God eternally and necessarily conceives the proposition Snow
is white, and Jones can believe it via ‘Snow is white,’ while Smith can believe it via
‘Schnee ist weiss.’ So, God’s thought is intersubjectively shared by both Smith and
Jones. Ruloff then states, “FPR provides a plausible account of how mental states
gain their representational content”14. Well, more accurately, it provides a plau-
sible account of how human mental states gain their representational content. So,
I conclude that there is no good reason why a view consistent with NPR is less
explanatory than Ruloff.
So, we have seen that we have good reasons to think that propositions are
thoughts.
3.3 LNC is a necessarily existent, true thought
At this point, we have the premises (M1) LNC is a necessarily true proposition,
(M3) LNC necessarily exists, and (M4) All propositions are thoughts. From M1 we
12Ibid., 49.
13Ibid.
14Ibid
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get that LNC is necessarily true and is a proposition. From M2 we get that LNC
necessarily exist. And from M4 we get that LNC is a thought. So, we can conjoin
these properties to get (M5) LNC is a necessarily existent, true thought.15
3.4 If LNC is a necessarily existent, true thought, then there is a necessarily
existent mind
But then there must be some mind(s) which thinks the LNC. For a thought exists
only if there is a mind to think it. So, if LNC is a necessarily existent, true thought,
then either (i) in each possible world some contingents mind(s) produces it or (ii)
in each possible world, some necessary mind(s) produces LNC.
Suppose (i) that LNC is the thought of contingent minds. Then, as Anderson
& Welty (2011, 336, f. 31) imagine, every possible world contains at least one con-
tingent mind that produces LNC. But necessarily, a thought belongs to the mind
that produces it.16 The thoughts of contingent minds are themselves contingent.
But as we have seen, LNC is not contingent. Hence, it cannot be identified with
the thought of any contingent minds.
Additionally, there is a modal intuition that there are possible worlds in which
there are no contingent minds. Again, think about Max Black’s world that con-
tains only two qualitatively identical spheres. There are no contingently existent
minds there. But LNC will exist in it, and so there will be some mind to think it.
Smith (1994, p. 42) considers a different approach to this issue without the
15There is a possible worry here. If LNC is a thought, then it is about something in particular.
Maybe that something is a second-order property, specifically, the complex property of being in-
compatible with other properties and not being able to belong to the same object as that other property,
or something of that sort. So, it would seem that such a property is what is doing the explanatory
work of LNC. But then LNC would be superfluous (as a proposition/thought).
However, LNC is a general proposition/thought in that it is about all objects and properties
whatsoever. So, there is nothing in particular in the world that the LNC is about. So, LNC is not
explanatorily superfluous.
16Ibid.
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appeal to the modal intuition. Perhaps, contingent minds exist in every possible
world yet at some but not all times. But Smith points out that if propositions
can exist at times, then some of them exist at all times, for example, LNC. So,
there will be times at which a proposition exists but it will not be thought of by
a contingent mind. But a proposition must be thought of by some mind(s). So, at
these times they are thought of by some necessary mind(s). Either way there are
problems with option (i).
Now suppose (ii), that in each possible world, some necessary mind(s) pro-
duces it. Then either in each possible world, some necessary mind produces it or
some necessary mind(s) produces it but not the same one in each world. Of course,
just one necessary mind suffices to do the job. So, by the principle of simplicity,
we need not postulate extra necessary minds. But if we have independent reasons
for thinking that there are multiple necessary minds which entertain LNC, then
so be it. Indeed, there are models of the Trinity that purport to show how it can be
coherent to say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three minds in one being.
William Craig (2006, 101) calls his ‘Trinity Monotheism.’ He describes it this way:
God is an immaterial substance or soul endowed with three sets of
cognitive faculties each of which is sufficient for personhood, so that
God has three centers of self-consciousness, intentionality, and will.
[...] But that they are divine on the final model seems obvious, since
the model describes a God who is tri-personal. The persons are the
minds of God.
In any case, to say that there is a necessarily existent mind just is to say that there
is at least one necessarily existent mind. So, there seems to be no problem with
supposing (ii).
So, if LNC is a necessarily existent, true thought, then there is a necessarily
existent mind.
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3.5 There is a necessarily existent mind
So, we have the premises (M5) LNC is a necessarily existent, true thought and
(M6) If LNC is a necessarily existent, true thought, then there is a necessarily exis-
tent mind. So, by modus ponens, we get our conclusion (M7) There is a necessarily
existent mind.
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4 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, upon conceptual analysis of this necessarily existent mind, we
should think of it as a personal mind. The only minds we know about that can
do the job are those of persons, as was suggested in the introduction. So, there is
a necessarily existent person. But since LNC is a nonphysical object, like A&W’s
logical laws, such a person is spiritual in nature. So, there is a necessarily existent,
spiritual person.
56
REFERENCES
Adams, R. M. (1987). The virtue of faith and other essays in philosophical theology.
Oxford University Press.
Anderson, J. N., & Welty, G. (2011). The Lord of Noncontradiction: An Argument
for God From Logic. Philosophia Christi, 13(2), 321–338.
Anderson, J. N., & Welty, G. (2013). In defense of the argument for god from
logic. Evangelical Philosophical Society.
URL http://www.epsociety.org/userfiles/art-Anderson-Welty%20(In%
20Defense%20of%20the%20Argument%20for%20God%20from%20Logic).pdf
Arenhart, J. R., & Krause, D. (2014). Contradiction, quantum mechanics, and the
square of opposition. arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.1836.
Aristotle (2014). The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation,
One-Volume Digital Edition. Princeton University Press.
Arntzenius, F. (2000). Are there really instantaneous velocities? The Monist, 83(2),
187–208.
Berto, F. (2006). Meaning, metaphysics, and contradiction. American Philosophical
Quarterly, 43(4), 283–297.
Berto, F. (2008). Adynaton and material exclusion. Australasian Journal of Philos-
ophy, 86(2), 165–190.
Bozzo, A. P. (2012). Are propositions divine thoughts? Evangelical Philosophical
Society.
URL http://www.epsociety.org/userfiles/art-Bozzo%20(Are%
20Propositions%20Divine%20Thoughts-ToEPS.pdf
Brentano, F. (2009). Psychology from an empirical standpoint. Taylor & Francis, 2nd
57
ed.
Bueno, O., & Colyvan, M. (2004). Logical non-apriorism and the law of non-
contradiction. In G. Priest, J. Beall, & B. P. Armour-Garb (Eds.) The Law of
Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays, (pp. 156–175). Oxford University
Press.
Cooper, J. M., & Hutchinson, D. S. (1997). Plato Complete Works. Hackett Publish-
ing Company.
Craig, W. L. (2006). Trinity monotheism once more: A response to daniel howard-
snyder. Philosophia Christi, 8(1), 101–113.
Cushing, J. T. (1994). Quantum Mechanics: Historical Contingency and the Copen-
hagen Hegemony. University of Chicago Press.
Estrada-González, L. (2014). On the possibility of realist dialetheism. SATS, 15(2),
197–217.
FIFA.com (2016). Greater use of goal-line technology.
URL http://www.fifa.com/development/news/y=2016/m=1/news=
greater-use-of-goal-line-technology-2756397.html
Grim, P. (2004). What is a contradiction? In G. Priest, J. Beall, & B. P. Armour-
Garb (Eds.) The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays, (pp. 49–72).
Oxford University Press.
Hegel, G. W. F. (2010). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: the science of logic. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Huggett, N. (2010). Zeno’s paradoxes. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy. Winter 2010 ed.
Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Mares, E. D. (2004). Semantic dialetheism. In G. Priest, J. C. Beall, & B. Armour-
Garb (Eds.) The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press.
58
Martin, B. (2014). Dialetheism and the impossibility of the world. Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, 93(1), 61–75.
McGrath, M. (2014). Propositions. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. Spring 2014 ed.
Merricks, T. (2015). Propositions. OUP Oxford.
Molnar, G. (2000). Truthmakers for negative truths. Australasian Journal of Phi-
losophy, 78(1), 72–86.
Mortensen, C. (2015). Change and inconsistency. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2015 ed.
Plantinga, A. (1983). On existentialism. Philosophical Studies, 44(1), 1–20.
Plantinga, A. (1987). Two concepts of modality: Modal realism and modal reduc-
tionism. Philosophical Perspectives, 1(11), 189–231.
Plantinga, A. (2007). Appendix: Two dozen (or so) theistic arguments. Alvin
Plantinga, (pp. 203–227).
Price, H. (1990). Why ‘not’? Mind, 99(394), 221–238.
Priest, G. (1989). Reductio ad absurdum et modus tollendo ponens. Priest et
al.[38], (pp. 613–626).
Priest, G. (2006). In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent. Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Priest, G. (2014). One: Being an Investigation Into the Unity of Reality and of its
Parts, Including the Singular Object Which is Nothingness. OUP Oxford.
Priest, G., Beall, J., & Armour-Garb, B. P. (2004). The Law of Non-Contradiction :
New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Rosen, G. (2014). Abstract objects. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. Fall 2014 ed.
Ruloff, C. P. (2014). Divine Thoughts and Fregean Propositional Realism. Inter-
59
national Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 76(1), 41–51.
Russell, B. (1919). On propositions: What they are and how they mean. Proceed-
ings of the Aristotelian Society, 2, 1–43.
Shannon, N. D. (2012). Necessity, univocism, and the triune god: A response to
anderson and welty. Evangelical Philosophical Society.
URL http://epsociety.org/userfiles/Shannon%20(Response_to_
Anderson_and_Welty-final).pdf
Smith, Q. (1994). The conceptualist argument for god’s existence. Faith and Phi-
losophy, 11(1), 38–49.
Soames, S. (2014). Why the traditional conceptions of propositions can’t be cor-
rect. New thinking about propositions, (pp. 25–45).
Stephanou, Y. (2007). Serious actualism. The Philosophical Review, 116(2), 219–
250.
Stoljar, D., & Damnjanovic, N. (2014). The deflationary theory of truth. In E. N.
Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2014 ed.
Tahko, T. E. (2009). The law of non-contradiction as a metaphysical principle.
Australasian Journal of Logic, 7, 32–47.
Tahko, T. E. (2012). Boundaries in reality. Ratio, 25(4), 405–424.
Tahko, T. E. (2014). The metaphysical interpretation of logical truth. In P. Rush
(Ed.) The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All
Things In Between, (pp. 233–248). Cambridge University Press.
Tahko, T. E. (2015). An Introduction to Metametaphysics. Cambridge University
Press.
Welty, G. (2014). Theistic conceptual realism. In P. Gould (Ed.) Beyond the Control
of God? Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects, chap. 4. Blooms-
bury Academic.
60
Zalta, E. N. (1988). Logical and analytic truths that are not necessary. The Journal
of Philosophy, 85(2), 57–74.
61
